A fine-grained quantum state of the world is a questionable concept insofar as its details are not empirically verifiable. Since, however, setting any fixed boundary to the applicability of quantum description suffers from arbitrariness, and since some aspects of a supposed quantum state of the world may be partially testable, after a suitable clarification of the sense in which probability is being used in that context, it is perhaps not entirely absurd to consider the existence of a coarse-grained quantum state of the world. The quantum state, complemented by dynamical laws and other ingredients, is then supposed to provide a description of the world as a closed system -a system that contains also the observers and does not need to refer to anything external.
A fine-grained quantum state of the world is a questionable concept insofar as its details are not empirically verifiable. Since, however, setting any fixed boundary to the applicability of quantum description suffers from arbitrariness, and since some aspects of a supposed quantum state of the world may be partially testable, after a suitable clarification of the sense in which probability is being used in that context, it is perhaps not entirely absurd to consider the existence of a coarse-grained quantum state of the world. The quantum state, complemented by dynamical laws and other ingredients, is then supposed to provide a description of the world as a closed system -a system that contains also the observers and does not need to refer to anything external.
Since the consistent-histories formulation of quantum mechanics 1,2,3 has been advocated by some of its proponents as a natural framework for dealing with closed systems, this language will be used as a basis. In this framework events are represented by projections. A family of consistent histories is specified by an initial state ρ(0), the Hamiltonian of the world H, and sequences of events. Each sequence is represented by a chain of Heisenberg-picture projectors:
where the subscript on the projector E α i i refers to the nature of the resolution of the identity, and the superscript to the specific element within that set of projectors. The probability P (C) for the occurrence of a history corresponding to the chain C is:
.
All histories within a family must fulfill certain consistency conditions so that the probabilities for their being realized satisfy normal additivity rules. Consistency alone does not guarantee that the events in a history correspond to what in the Copenhagen interpretation would be called "actualized" or "registered" events. In the absence of external observers, it appears that a selection criterion needs to be added to the consistent-histories formalism to characterize such events, which are important for describing the experience that certain events actually occurred. It turns out that a mathematical formulation of such a criterion is no easy task. 4 But the physical basis that qualifies certain types of events as actualized can be examined, and is discussed in some detail in appendix A. Roughly speaking, the essence of actualization is verifiability from records; and events which may be regarded as having been actualized or registered will be called "verifiable" from here on. For the main point of this paper the explicit details of the qualifying conditions are not needed; but it is necessary to assume that a selection criterion exists. One of the suppositions underlying the Copenhagen interpretation, pithily stated by van Kampen as a "theorem," is that "quantum mechanics deals with macroscopic phenomena, which are unperturbed by observation."
5 In terms of the events which enter into consistent histories, the analog of that statement is that the quantum events which are directly relevant to describing occurrences in the observable world are exclusively verifiable events.
Even in classical physics it is imagined that there exists an underlying fine-grained world, the complete details of which can never be checked within the limitations imposed by the availability of resources. Turning to a quantum description of the world adds the need to consider superpositions with phase correlations, and subtracts the possibility of certain types of simultaneously precise data, but it is not greatly different in spirit as far as entertaining the idea of the world as a closed system is concerned. In particular, among classical statistical physics expositions can be found statements like "the entropy of the world, regarded as a closed system, is non-decreasing." The question this article addresses is: What is the nature of the appropriate coarse-grained quantum state, and how does it evolve in time, so as to reflect what is happening in a world in which the second law holds?
It should be made clear at the outset that the goal here is only to clarify the nature of the appropriate quantum representation. There is no claim that this quantum description explains the origin of the second law -the common assumption that the world was in a particularly low entropy state once, and is still relatively low in entropy today, as the cause for the validity of the second law in the present era, will again be needed (in the specific form described in section 3). But even with such a modest goal something can be learned. Because the aim of a self-contained quantum description of the world is so ambitious, whereas the language of consistent histories is so very economical -thus far the branching of histories is essentially the only type of metamorphosis seriously considered -it turns out that even the mere task of describing entropy increase requires some modification of that perspective. The modification consists of the realization that the process of uniting two or more histories together is as relevant to describing the observable world as the opposite process of splitting a history into separate alternatives: that is to say, the time evolution of the quantum state appropriate for describing the observable world does not trace a single path through a family of ever branching histories, but is instead associated with the merging as well as the branching of histories.
2. Entropy is non-increasing under branching, when averaged over the branches.
Although some workers prefer to speak of only histories and not the instantaneous density matrix of the world, most researchers, once taking the plunge of considering a self-contained quantum description of the world, do not seem to object to this notion. Since the purpose here is to provide a quantum representation of the change in time of the macroscopic world of verifiable facts, it is appropriate to have an instantaneous density matrix to correspond to the situation at a specific instant. The consistent-histories formalism suggests a natural density matrix to consider. The matrix ρ(C, t n ) defined by
is a suitable candidate, because it has the property that the conditional probability for the outcome of the next event to be that particular alternative represented by E α n+1 n+1 (t n+1 ), given the fact that the past history is already specified by C(α 1 ...α n ), equals appropriately T r[ρ(C, t n )E α n+1 n+1 (t n+1 )]. The density matrix is alternatively defined by the recursive relation
The way this density matrix enters the probability for the next event recommends it as a candidate for a quantum representation for the instantaneous state of the world, provided ρ(0) is a suitable initial state of the world. Before one examines whether the evolution of ρ(C, t n ) with increasing n may provide a description of how the observable world evolves, it is necessary to recall one important difference between a closed-system description and the usual quantum description, which mostly deals with semi-open subsystems. A subsystem, to be described by Schroedinger evolution, must be effectively isolated at least some of the time, but it is semi-open in that there are interactions with other parts of the world outside this subsystem during measurement-like events. Consider, for example, the case of the spin of an electron initially prepared to point in the z-direction. Suppose its projection along the x-axis is later measured at time t 1 , and its projection along the y-axis is measured at a still later time t 2 , with no nontrivial dynamical evolution between measurements. A strictly subsystem description would represent the four possible histories for the spin of the electron by chains of the form P ± y (t 2 )P ± x (t 1 ), where the the P's are just 2×2 projection operators for the spin components s y and s x , together with the initial condition ρ(0) = P + z . But these four possible histories do not form a consistent family. Since, however, such successive measurements are physically realizable, there must be consistent histories describing these four possible alternative outcomes; so what went wrong? What has been left out in the subsystem description is the fact that the first measurement at time t 1 leaves behind records, and the situation at time t 2 is not specified completely by the y-component of the electron's spin: there also exist records showing that the x-component of its spin was such and such at time t 1 . It is with the inclusion of the records of previous events, which still exist at later times, that the branching character of verifiable histories and their consistency naturally follow. The lesson is that a closed-system quantum description of the world, coarse as it may be, must be comprehensive enough to include at least the records that verifiable events leave behind. With this understanding of the self-sufficiency of the state which ρ(C, t n ) is supposed to represent, one now turns to its change with time.
For orientation consider first the case where ρ(0) is a pure state. Since in this case ρ 2 (C, t n ) = ρ(C, t n ), it follows that ρ(C, t n ) is also a pure state. Then there is no increase in randomness as far as the underlying quantum state is concerned, as measured by the von Neumann entropy s[ρ(C, t n )] ≡ −T r[ρ(C, t n )lnρ(C, t n )]. This is hardly relevant to the task at hand, that of describing the entropy increase in the observable world, because a pure state contains much more information than the macroscopic configuration of the world, and the von Neumann entropy of the pure state is a far cry from the classical entropy of the macro-world. If, in contrast, the density matrix ρ(C, t n ) is obtained from a history where the initial state and the subsequent events comprise all that are verifiable from the records in the observable world and no more, the von Neumann entropy s[ρ(C, t n )] would then be a reasonable measure to consider for describing the degree of disorder in the observable world. The entropy of the coarse-grained quantum state and the entropy of classical thermodynamics are at best only approximately correlated, but an appropriate choice of the coarse-grained quantum state ought to be such that at least there is a parallel in the tendency of decrease or increase for the two kinds of entropies. In regard to the choice of initial condition, esthetic considerations have been advanced to favor one or another pure state of the world as being the appropriate initial state, but the choice of reference 1, which corresponds to having the totally random state as the initial condition, also has the merit of simplicity. From an observational standpoint the initial state is unknown except for what can be gleaned from records. The records under-determine the state, and the most natural initial state to use for constructing those consistent histories that are appropriate for describing the observable world is an initial density matrix that is the least biased among all the states consistent with the records. Such a maximum-entropy state ρ(0) compatible with the records is very likely neither pure nor totally random, but an intermediate kind of a mixed state. For the purpose of describing the entropy of the observable world the observation-based initial state is much more relevant than a theorybased initial state, but the former has the disadvantage of instability when the records change. If the objective is to describe the entropy-increasing tendency of the observable world at a late stage, rather than to describe the Planck era, the initial time t = 0 can be chosen to be some specific post-big-bang moment when the world was relatively chaotic rather than the true "beginning of time," whatever that means. It may be hoped that with a suitable choice of the initial time the maximum-entropy initial state compatible with later records is relatively insensitive to further changes in the records, and this is what will be assumed below. Focusing now on the particular density matrix ρ(C, t n ) corresponding to a history where the initial state and the later events are all that are verifiable from records and nothing more, one can finally return to the question of whether s[ρ(C, t n )] increases with n.
The answer to this question is negative. For mixed states the relevant result to consider is the theorem:
It is understood here that the set {E α } consists of orthogonal projectors which resolve the identity. Since any chain of projections entering into the specification of a history is built up from projections satisfying the conditions of this theorem, it follows that, when averaged over the branches of each splitting, the entropy for the density matrix ρ(C, t n ) is non-increasing with n, regardless of what kind of coarse-graining has been built into the projections. This theorem does not rule out the possibility that along a particular branch the entropy is non-decreasing, but that would be an exceptional situation requiring an explanation, for it goes against the average trend of Eq.(4), which is for the entropy associated with ρ(C, t n ) not to increase with increasing n.
The merging of histories
The physical content of the above result is as follows. Each branching into offshoots is a refining of the specification of the state, provided the splitting does not destroy memory of the parent state. Obviously, specification of each offshoot requires more information than specifying the parent if complete memory about the parent state survives. The noncommutativity of projection operators implies, however, that branching can destroy some of the memory concerning the parent state. The above theorem shows that on the average the information gained exceeds the information destroyed. Whether expressions like "observable world," and "memory," and "information" can be given unambiguous meaning will be examined in appendix A; at this point let it be tentatively supposed that these expressions have sensible meanings. Then the entropy-decreasing tendency of branching is at least intuitively comprehensible, and this tendency becomes even more unavoidable for a history in which all the events are verifiable. The above theorem implies that under a series of branchings the entropy tends to decrease even when the consistency conditions for histories have not been imposed. The addition of consistency conditions forbids interference from different branches from being observable later, and to that extent memory of ancestry is partially retained. For verifiable events the genealogy is even manifestly on the record.
The most natural way out of the quandary of a tendency for the von Neumann entropy to decrease under branching is to take into account the fact that in a world of increasing entropy records do decay. If a branching in the past is still relevant today because of the existence of records, then the subsequent decay of these records would partially undo the effect of that branching, as far as its relevance to the future is concerned. It is desirable to incorporate this "undoing" without spoiling the simplicity of the consistent-histories language. The following proposal for bringing the deterioration of records into the quantum description of a closed system is guided by two premises: (i) the verifiability of a given event is a time-dependent property, since records change with time; and (ii) the decay of the records concerning a past event is not the same as quantum erasure. The implication of the first premise is that, unlike a branching which involves just one time, each merging involves two times: an earlier moment when the event occurred, and the later moment when the records concerning the outcome of that event are obliterated. The implication of the second premise is that the decay of records does not completely undo a projection. If one were to represent the decay of the records concerning an event at time t i by removing the projection E α i i (t i ) altogether from the chain C which helps to define ρ(C, t n ), it would be as if no event happened at t i at all; whereas the decay of records presupposes that an event did occur, and it was even verifiable at one time, and the different outcomes were decoherent. When the records decay at time t n and it is no longer possible to verify the outcome of what actually happened at t i , the relative likehood of the various alternatives being the best that can be deduced from the surviving evidence, these alternatives are to be incoherently summed. In contrast, removal of the projection at t i would correspond to a quantum erasure, with the alternative components added back together with exactly the correct phases, which is imaginable in a laboratory setting but is not realistic for the overwhelming majority of actual events.
Thus the erosion at time t n of the records concerning an event at t i , where t n > t i , is to be represented mathematically by the transformation T :
where
This corresponds to a situation where the last step in the destruction of records is through the deterministic processes which result from the evolution generated by exp[−iH(t n − t n−1 )]. If, on the contrary, the destruction of records is itself accompanied by the actualization of a new quantum event, then one has instead:
The proposal is that the instantaneous quantum state suitable for describing what happens in the macro-world corresponds to a density matrix of the form ρ(C(α 1 ...ᾱ i ...α n ), t n ) rather than of the form ρ(C(α 1 ...α i ...α n ), t n ). In other words, the coarse-graining necessary for describing the observable world cannot be all effected through the use of suitably coarse projections alone: some coarse-graining requires convex summations, as in Eq. (5) and Eq.(6). The resulting change in the formalism is very minor, and in particular the transformation corresponding to a branching is given by:
, identical in structure to Eq.(3b). It should be noted, however, that the original chains C(α 1 ...α n ) are still relevant because the additional consistency conditions to be fulfilled with the introduction of the new projection E α n n (t n ) are in terms of the individual C(α 1 ...α i ...α n ) and not a sum over α i . Without effective records to keep the different α i -alternatives manifestly distinct, the fulfillment of the consistency conditions becomes less trivial. Physically the distinctness of the original branches may be maintained, e.g., by branch-identity-carrying photons which escape to infinity and become inaccessible, rather than by locally accessible records. The process represented by Eq. (5) is certainly entropy non-decreasing. For the process of Eq.(6), there is competition between the entropy non-decreasing convex summation, and the average entropy non-increasing additional branching at t n . Without further input it is not possible to say which tendency wins. If, however, the world's capability for carrying records is already near saturation, in the sense that the creation of new records requires in most cases the destruction of some existing records, then records are almost continuously being created and destroyed. Over the course of many such creations and destructions there is a weak sense in which the entropy-increasing trend wins. The reason is contained in the following proposition:
Proposition
The average decrease in entropy due to a branching event is less than or equal to the average increase in entropy when subsequently the records corroborating this event are destroyed.
With the notation of Eq.(4), the absolute magnitude of the average decrease in entropy as a result of a branching is
, and the average entropy increase accompanying the destruction of those records which verify the outcome of the branching is s[ p α ρ
Thus, analogous to the usual assumption that the world is currently in a low-entropy state, the operative assumption here that can lead to a tendency for entropy increase is that the present world is already near saturation for record-keeping, so that records are continuously being generated and destroyed. The degree of plausibility of this assumption is also discussed in appendix A.
Bennett and Landauer 8, 9 have already pointed out that entropy increase is associated with the erasure of records. Their analysis was in a classical setting, and therefore they did not address the entropy-decreasing tendency of amplified quantum events, nor need they be concerned with the difference between classical erasure and quantum erasure. When amplified quantum fluctuations and destructions of records are both involved in an event, there seem to be no a priori basis to say that one of the two tendencies necessarily wins. But when new records are made mostly by erasing old ones, there would be frequent destructions of records, and through many creations and destructions of records there is an average trend for entropy to increase.
Although the tendency for entropy to decrease under branching, on the average, is suggestive of how the world, starting from a state not necessarily low in entropy, may come to be in a low entropy state at some later stage, this is not the point of this note -there are other factors to be considered on how a low-entropy state may emerge in the course of cosmological evolution. Rather, the purpose of this article is to emphasize that, once the validity of the second law in the macro-world is taken as an input, then in order for a coarse-grained quantum state to describe what takes place in such a world, its time evolution has to incorporate the merging of histories. If the transformations that this coarse-grained quantum state undergoes are still to be spoken of as a sequence of events, then the notion of an event has to be generalized to include negative as well as positive events: there are creative events during which the state changes according to Eq.(7), or destructive events during which the state changes according to Eq.(5), or mixed events in which the state transforms according to Eq.(6).
Appendices

A. Explanation of terms
This article contains expressions like "observable world,""information," "verifiable," and "records," which inevitably invite questions: Whose information? Observable and verifiable by whom? How stable does a physical correlation have to be to count as a record? Discussion of these issues leads to what many physicists would dismiss as "philosophy," and yet avoidance of these issues does not save time. As continuing controversies surrounding time's arrow or quantum measurement show, some knotty issues refuse to go away. Even when the final answers are not available, it is better to state one's tentative understanding as clearly and explicitly as possible.
One way to specify the meaning of such expressions is through correlation with operations. The basic issues are first of all what kind of an event can be said to have verifiably occurred, and subsequently when the event can be said to cease to be verifiable. In an operational sense, an event is verifiable if the community of scientists, on the basis of records, is capable of reaching a consensus on the outcome, provided efforts are devoted to the task of checking this event, limited only by the availability of natural resources. Similarly the information content of the observable world is interpreted to be the total database needed for a complete description of the macroscopic world, including every bit of datum that is verifiable. This way of describing the relation between records and the verifiability of an event does not require the records to be unchanging: they can be evolving in time, because all that is required is for the scientists to be able to use them to unequivocally interpret an event in the past. By the same token, the decay of records can take many forms: some due to the corruption of information through classical processes, and some through random events in which quantum fluctuations play a role. That is why in the sentence following Eq.(5) a distinction is made between the decay of records through deterministic processes and through quantum fluctuations. That records can decay even when the process results from exp[−iH(t n − t n−1 )] is not a contradiction, because realistically the scientific community cannot completely evaluate this operator within the limits of finite resources.
Note that it is potential verifiability that matters rather than actual verification, because rigorous verification is costly in labor and resources, and a coarse-grain description in which every datum is actually verified, rather than just being verifiable, would turn out to be very crude and spotty. In contrast, a description in terms of verifiable events can be much finer. The distinction between verified and verifiable events also helps to answer the following question: With the notion of information being so closely tied to what the scientific community can verify, how is the increase in scientific knowledge over time to be reconciled with entropy increase? The answer is that whereas the amount of scientifically verified data is increasing, the (much greater) amount of scientifically verifiable data is non-increasing when entropy is non-decreasing. But the idea of calling an event "verifiable" provided only that it can be actually verified when attention is focused on the task of its validation may seem to lead to a contradiction: the attention of the scientific community can after all be turned to checking the position of a particle with great accuracy or the momentum of a particle with great accuracy; hence would not the position and momentum be simultaneously verifiable? It must be remembered, however, that the branching structure of a consistent family is regarded as being first given, and the verifiability of the events entering a history is being considered in that context. The consistency conditions exclude histories with events which refer to the position and the momentum of a particle at the same time. As long as the focus of validation is directed to one or another of the events already in consistent histories, no contradiction would arise. The necessity of compatibility between successive events is a point already emphasized with the spin-measurement example back in section 2.
By using potential verifiability rather than actual verification as a selection criterion, one can envision a relatively refined coarse-grain description of the observable world. In cosmological terms such a stage was reached probably only after the recombination era: the entropy non-increasing tendency of branching discussed in this article becomes relevant only after it is possible for branches to be sharply distinguished through the existence of records. Initially this tends to bring most branches towards low entropy states. It is only after a vast number of verifiable branchings already left a wealth of records, allowing a fairly detailed description of the macro-world, that new records are mostly made at the expense of erasing old ones. Even then, if an event has a huge number of redundant records, the erasing of a few of these will not destroy the credibility of the event; and therefore the hypothesis of "near saturation of record-keeping capability" presupposes that overall there are far more nonredundant records than redundant ones. In a refined description this is not implausible: for instance, the different blades of grass in a meadow may appear to carry the same, redundant information about shape, color, and genetic makeup, but in a refined description the differences among them, which also constitute records, are far more numerous than the shared properties, and on the whole the records are largely non-redundant. On the other hand, human activities directed towards the perpetuation of records, often through prodigious redundancy, decrease the total amount of distinct data that nature can keep, and hence, paradoxically, decrease the world's overall information content.
One may ask why "scientists" are not replaced by the IGUSes (information gathering and utilizing systems) of Gell-Mann and Hartle. The answer is that the greater generality of IGUSes is not particularly helpful in this case: an ant is an IGUS, and presumably it has some notion of whether some kinds of events happened or not, but one would be most reluctant to add to the list of verifiable events something that only ants are aware of with no possibility of independent checks by human scientists, now or in the future, even when attention is directed to that event. In other words, even with the introduction of IGUSes, reference to the "community of scientists" would still be necessary.
With the above explanation of what is meant by "verifiable through records," it is finally possible to specify, in principle, when a formerly verifiable event ceases to be verifiable: an event at t i may be said to have become unverifiable at the time t n in a particular branch if the records from t n onward no longer permit the scientists in this branch to corroborate the outcome of that event.
Although a scientific-community-based approach results in a verifiability criterion that is close to the common-sensical notion of "objective reality," there are nonetheless some counter-intuitive consequences. By the expression "scientific community" one usually includes not only today's scientists but also scientists of the future, because technology improves with time and defining verifiability as what current technology can ascertain is too restrictive. Furthermore, there were no scientists in the early stages of cosmological evolution, and yet some of those early occurrences are regarded as verifiable today, because scientists living considerably later than these events can still check them out from the records. Once it is accepted that future scientists must be included in the notion of a scientific community, one has to face the awkward fact that in quantum mechanics the future is branch dependent. Suppose, for example, that a continuation of our history into two different future branches, branch A and branch B, results in similar inanimate records, such as the Oklo records regarding a past chain reaction on earth, but different consequences for life. Whereas in branch A life continues to thrive, in branch B life is extinguished forever after time t e . Then according to the scientific-community-based criterion, the Oklo event remains verifiable in branch A but is not verifiable in branch B after t e . Although such anthropocentrism may be acceptable to a pragmatic philosophy, it is unsatisfactory if one wants a strictly objective standard that is independent of the existence of people. The alternative is to abstract the essence of "verifiability by a scientific community" into a mathematical criterion for factuality that can be applied even when life does not exist. This objective has not yet been accomplished; but a formulation in terms of suitable complexity measures, in effect having finite-resource computers filling in for scientists, appears possible. The points discussed above such as the distinction between verification and verifiability, and the time dependence of the amount of verifiable data, are relevant to the formulation of an abstract criterion as well, to the extent that the issues concern the nature of records rather than the existence of scientists.
B. A related theorem
The inequality Eq.(4) was first conjectured by Groenewold, but a direct approach to its proof led to considerable complication and difficulty 6 . It was later proved by Linblad 7 , in a way which is elegant but which requires additional knowledge of the entropic properties of density matrices. In view of this, it may be useful to present a weaker result, which however can be proved easily, on the non-increasing nature of randomness under branching, when averaged over the branches, with −T r(ρ 2 ) serving as a measure of randomness. Theorem If ρ ′ α ≡ E α ρE α /p α , and p α ≡ T r(E α ρ),
It is convenient to first consider density matrices which have non-vanishing matrix elements only in the subspace that E N , the sum of the first N of the E α 's, projects onto. Thus all the sums up to Eq.(A4) refer to this finite dimensional subspace. Let ρ = n r n |n n|, where |n is a normalized eigenvector of ρ, and the eigenvalue r n may have the same value for different n. Define g α,n,m ≡ n|E α |m . Then the RHS of Eq.(A1) equals − α,n,m r n r m |g α,n,m | 2 /p α . In the Radon inequality 10 :
q > 1 and a n and b n are positive. But for q = 2 the inequality holds also when b n is positive and a n is real. Applying the inequality to the real and imaginary parts of a complex A α , one finds (A α )
Hence by substituting g α,n,m for A α , and p α for b α , and using α g α,n,m = δ n,m , one obtains α T r(|n n|E α |m m|E α )/p α ≥ δ n,m (A4),
where any term in the sum for which p α vanishes is defined to be zero. The inequality (A1) results from multiplying Eq.(A4) by r n r m and summing over (n, m). For more general density matrices, the difference between using ρ itself and using the truncated density matrix ρ T ≡ E N ρE N /T r(E N ρ), in the expression on either side of Eq.(A1), can be made arbitrarily small by letting N become large. Hence the inequality Eq.(A1) holds in a separable Hilbert space.
